University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law
4-13-2022

Assessing Automated Administration
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Alicia Lai
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Public
Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Science and Technology Law
Commons, Science and Technology Studies Commons, and the Theory and Algorithms Commons

Repository Citation
Coglianese, Cary and Lai, Alicia, "Assessing Automated Administration" (2022). Faculty Scholarship at
Penn Carey Law. 2826.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2826

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law by an authorized administrator of Penn
Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Assessing Automated Administration
Cary Coglianese and Alicia Lai

ABSTRACT
To fulfill their responsibilities, governments rely on administrators and employees who, simply
because they are human, are prone to individual and group decision-making errors. These errors
have at times produced both major tragedies and minor inefficiencies. One potential strategy for
overcoming cognitive limitations and group fallibilities is to invest in artificial intelligence (AI) tools
that allow for the automation of governmental tasks, thereby reducing reliance on human decisionmaking. Yet as much as AI tools show promise for improving public administration, automation itself
can fail or can generate controversy. Public administrators face the question of when exactly they
should use automation. This paper considers the justifications for governmental reliance on AI along
with the legal concerns raised by such reliance. Comparing AI-driven automation with a status quo
that relies on human decision-making, the paper provides public administrators with guidance for
making decisions about AI use. After explaining why prevailing legal doctrines present no intrinsic
obstacle to governmental use of AI, the paper presents considerations for administrators to use in
choosing when and how to automate existing processes. It recommends that administrators ask
whether their contemplated uses meet the preconditions for the deployment of AI tools and whether
these tools are in fact likely to outperform the status quo. In moving forward, administrators should
also consider the possibility that a contemplated AI use will generate public or legal controversy,
and then plan accordingly. The promise and legality of automated administration ultimately depends
on making responsible decisions about when and how to deploy this technology.
KEYWORDS: autonomous systems, automation, artificial intelligence, AI, information technology,
e-government, digital government, machine learning, constitutional & administrative law

Assessing Automated Administration
Cary Coglianese† and Alicia Lai††
Public administration is susceptible to a series of well-documented sources of error and
bias that stem from human cognition as well as from group decision-making. At times, these
limitations of human judgment have unfortunately led to major tragedies and troublesome
inefficiencies. To overcome the limitations of human decision-making, while concurrently
responding to pressing governance needs in the face of limited resources, public administrators
are beginning to explore new possibilities offered by artificial intelligence (AI) (Coglianese &
Ben Dor, 2021; Engstrom et al., 2020).*
AI tools promise to increase the accuracy, consistency, and speed of governmental
decisions and task performance. But they also present their own set of legal, management, and
political issues. When, if at all, should government agencies use automated AI tools to substitute
for existing human-based processes?
This paper assesses this question, offering a framework for deciding whether and when
administrative agencies should use AI tools that replace or significantly augment human
decision-making. These tools are themselves not perfect, but the relevant question confronting
public administrators is whether they do better than human decision-making at specific tasks.
Assessing the promise of automated administration will ultimately depend on making concrete,
relative assessments of whether specific AI tools can improve the status quo. Nevertheless, it is
possible to offer some general considerations to account for when making specific assessments.
We begin by presenting a general case for using automated AI tools in the public sector.
We next discuss the core legal issues that are likely implicated by governmental reliance on AI
tools. These tools can and do raise a range of legal issues, but we conclude that there currently
exist no intrinsic legal barriers to the use of AI under the prevailing administrative law doctrines
in the United States. As long as public administrators approach the development and deployment
of these tools with due care and responsibility, the use of AI can comfortably fit within
prevailing law. We conclude by offering guidance for the ultimate challenge for public
administrators: deciding when these tools should replace human decision-making in the
performance of specific tasks, and then determining how to design and implement these tools in
a responsible manner.
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I. THE CASE FOR AUTOMATING ADMINISTRATION
Governmental tasks today depend largely on human decision-making. As a result, many
of government’s failings—from major tragedies to minor inefficiencies—can be traced to
limitations on human decision-making. Even when humans act with good intentions, their
decisions can be prone to a wide array of well-documented cognitive biases, physical limitations,
external pressures, and basic missteps. Additional dysfunctionalities come into play when groups
of humans make collective decisions, as they often do in government.
Consider, for example, a few cases of major governmental breakdowns that stemmed in
substantial part from limitations in individual and collective decision-making:
•

When forced to confront a pandemic in early 2020, the U.S. federal government found
itself ill-prepared and fumbling in its response due to a variety of cognitive, bureaucratic,
and political factors. For years prior, governmental leaders tended to discount the risks of
and under-prepare for a major pandemic in the United States (Fisher, 2020; Lewis, 2021;
Slavitt, 2021). Even after the outbreak emerged, government officials and many
Americans found themselves prone to downplaying risks and resisting social distancing,
masking, and vaccinations (Halpern, Truog & Miller, 2020).

•

The 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on liftoff, resulting in the deaths of all
seven crew members, due to a series of individual and ground decision-making
deficiencies in deciding whether to launch in cold weather (Report of the Presidential
Commission, 1986; Vaughan, 2016). Group pressures among NASA managers and
Thiokol representatives play a pivotal role in the decision, as did the fatigue that had set
in for the key decision-makers (Forrest, 2005).

•

With the Bay of Pigs mission in 1961, human and organizational factors led to over a
hundred deaths in the failed attempt by the United States to overthrow the Castro
government in Cuba (Wyden, 1979). Decision-makers had succumbed to a sunk-cost
fallacy and President Kennedy and his advisors had asked few questions about risks and
back-up options and failed to invite alternative perspectives (Neustadt & May, 1986).

In raising these debacles across the decades, we do not necessarily to claim that AI would have
prevented them but instead to show the shortcomings of human decision-making that can play a
significant role in affecting public administration.
Unfortunately, these examples are not nearly as exceptional as they are prominent (Light,
2014; Schuck, 2014). To these examples, we can add a list of delays, biases, errors, and
inconsistencies that afflict other, more routine decisions made by individual actors within
government. A legion of frailties and foibles show that human decision-making is far from
perfect. At an individual level, the range of shortcomings can be grouped into at least six
categories:
1) Memory, fatigue, and aging. Human working memory is limited in its capacity (Cowan,
2001). Fatigued individuals are less alert, slower to react, experience lapses in memory,
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and generally have difficulty processing information (Alhola, 2007). Over time, aging
causes the human brain to shrink in size and its memory to decline (Peters, 2006).
2) System neglect. People can overemphasize signals relative to the underlying system
which generates the signals, such as in financial sectors (Kremer et al., 2011).
3) Loss aversion. People tend to dislike losses far more than they like corresponding gains
of the same magnitude (Freund & Özden, 2008).
4) Hindsight and availability bias. People increase their estimates of probabilities of past
events when retroactively considering an event (Fischhoff, 1975). Recall is subject to
availability bias, giving prominence to hazards that are more cognitively available
through recent and memorable instances of harm (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
5) Confirmation bias. People tend to search for and favor information that confirms their
existing beliefs, and they tend to ignore or discount information that is inconsistent with
or challenges those beliefs (Lord et al., 1979).
6) Racial and gender biases. People are subject to implicit biases in making judgments
whenever race, gender, and other similar characteristics are involved (Pascalis, 2005;
Eberhardt, 2019).
These various limitations of individual judgment ultimately affect governmental decisionmaking in many instances on a regular basis. For example, judges’ criminal sentencing decisions
have been shown to vary systematically based on the race of the defendant (Rehavi & Starr,
2014). Human processing of social security disability benefits produces results that differ
markedly from one administrative official to another (TRAC, 2011). Elected politicians tend to
process information selectively when evaluating the performance of public and private schools,
emphasizing the information that tends to confirm their prior beliefs (Baekgaard et al., 2019).
Although it may often be thought that group decisions bring added wisdom, once people
“put their heads together,” it is far from clear that group decision-making always fares better than
individual decision-making. Research generally shows that “[i]f some bias, error, or tendency
predisposes individuals to process information in a particular way, then groups exaggerate this
tendency” (Hinsz, Tindale & Vollrath, 1997). Moreover, collective decision-making brings its
own distinctive pathologies and limitations. One of these pathologies, known as groupthink,
follows from a psychological drive for consensus that suppresses dissent and the appraisal of
alternatives (Janis, 1972). Another related pathology, social loafing, stems from reductions in
motivation and accountability (Kogan & Wallach, 1967) and manifests as members of groups
become more likely to slack off (Latane et al., 1979). This corresponds with the well-known
problem of collective action, in which individuals have an incentive to free-ride on the
production of any collective good (Olson, 1965). In addition, even if all members of a group are
active and well-motivated, their collective decisions may lead to incoherent outcomes due to the
cycling of preferences among the group’s different members (Arrow, 1950). It was not without
reason that Otto von Bismark quipped that the making of laws reminded him of the making of
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sausages. Some research indicates that half of all decisions made within organizations end up in
failure (Nutt, 1999).
The many limitations of human decision-making—both individual and collective—
almost singlehandedly make the case for governmental use of AI tools. Although automated
alternatives to human judgment cannot eliminate every human error, AI tools can be designed to
“perform functions that are normally associated with human intelligence such as reasoning,
learning, and self-improvement” (NIST, 2021). They offer the prospect for improving the
accuracy and consistency of a variety of governmental tasks, as well as reducing delays and
improving administrative efficiencies (Lai, 2021; Sunstein et al., 2021).
Studies have shown that algorithms can more accurately recall memorized content than
humans can (Panigrahi, 2018). They can also do better than humans in terms of predictive
accuracy (Agrawal, Goldfarb & Gans, 2018). Research indicates that, if applied to bail decisions,
machine learning algorithms could be expected to reduce crime rates substantially even with no
change in the rate of jailing—or, alternatively, they could reduce jailing rates up to 42 percent with
no change in crime rates (Kleinberg et al., 2018). If used by environmental regulators to select
industrial facilities to inspect for compliance with water pollution regulations, machine learning
algorithms could help increase the identification of violators by as much as 600 percent (Hino,
Benami & Brooks, 2018).
Automated systems may also promote greater uniformity of decision-making, especially
for tasks that currently necessitate repeated judgments involving multiple individuals, such as
decisions concerning taxation, immigration status, or benefits eligibility. The alternative to
automation—namely, the training and overseeing of human decision-makers—can be costly or
ineffective (or both). But a uniform algorithmic system that applies nationwide may feasibly
achieve more consistent results across individual cases (Shrestha, 2019). Furthermore, when errors
arise or biases are discovered, automated systems that rely on a common algorithm may be easier to
modify and fix than to re-train a large number of human decision-makers.
In an important sense, the case for AI is already being made by its widespread adoption
and use in the private sector (McKinsey Global Institute, 2018). Digital algorithms are being
shown to outperform experts in performing certain medical diagnoses, making mortgage lending
decisions, and placing bets on sporting events (Tschandl, 2019; Gates, 2010; Pretorius & Parry,
2016).
Public administrators are also realizing that AI holds promise. Federal, state, and local
agencies have begun using automated tools for a variety of administrative tasks (Engstrom et al.,
2020; Bray, 2014). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for example, currently uses an AI system
to categorize reports of workplace injuries submitted by over 200,000 businesses (Chenok & Yusti,
2018; BLS, 2019). The Food and Drug Administration uses AI for real-time tracking and reporting
of microbial sources in foodborne outbreaks (FDA, 2011). The Federal Communications
Commission has used an AI tool to sort and analyze the 22 million public comments it received in
connection with its net neutrality rulemaking (Bray, 2014).
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Although the case for AI-driven automation appears quite strong, AI tools are themselves
far from perfect. They cannot be expected to address all deficiencies or errors in the public
sector, nor will they be devoid of new sources of error of their own, especially if their forecasts
are based on learning from data which already contains human biases. Moreover, when it comes
to the application of AI in the public sector, a key question arises about their legality. It is one
thing, after all, for AI tools to automate the selection and display of video choices on Netflix, but
another to take the place of human judges and public administrators making decisions that affect
people’s lives. Prior to deciding whether to use algorithms to automate governmental decisionmaking, public administrators would do well to consider whether that use might pose any
constitutional or administrative law roadblocks.
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE AUTOMATED STATE
The initial set of questions thus arises over whether government has the legal authority to
substitute machines for humans. AI tools have prompted a series of legal concerns that largely
stem from their black-box nature. Many of these legal concerns also arise, of course, with
governmental decisions based on human judgment. Yet today these concerns are targeted toward
algorithms, with particular worry expressed about the potential for machine learning to
discriminate, obscure, and rob human officials of autonomy and discretion. In deciding whether
to automate tasks using AI, then, public administrators will likely confront five major sets of
legal issues about accountability, procedural due process, transparency, privacy, and equality.
We conclude that none of these legal issues should act as any insuperable barrier to the
responsible deployment of AI in the public sector, even at times in ways that substitutes
automated decision-making for human judgment.
Accountability. The first question is whether a government agency replacing humanbased processes with AI-driven automated systems would deprive individuals of a right to an
accountable decision-maker (Busuioc, 2020). This concern is lessened when humans remain “in
the loop” in AI systems—that is, where the systems only point humans to possible options and
then the decision as to whether to take those options remains in human hands. A state supreme
court, for example, has sustained the use of an algorithm rating tool by a criminal judge in the
sentencing process because the scores generated by the algorithm were not the “determinative
factor” in the sentence imposed by the judge (State v. Loomis, 2016).
Even human-out-of-the-loop systems, in which the outcomes of AI analysis fully replace
human judgment, may still satisfy legal accountability principles. Under current constitutional
law principles in the United States, for example, the nondelegation doctrine requires that a
delegation of lawmaking powers must be constrained by an “intelligible principle” as to the basis
for these systems’ legal decisions. Is it possible that a delegation of decisional authority to an AIbased rulemaking system could run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine?
We think not, for two reasons. First, although the Supreme Court may well reinvigorate
the nondelegation doctrine in the years ahead, the doctrine has in reality never placed a major
constraint on administrative government and seems unlikely to do so in the future. The Court
long ago determined, for example, that the legislative articulation of goals as vague as “public
interest, convenience, and necessity” satisfy the intelligible principle test.
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Second, and more importantly, any exercise of rulemaking authority by an automated
system based on AI would be driven by what would of necessity be a highly intelligible
principle, as machine learning algorithms can only work if their goals are stated clearly and with
mathematical precision. Thus, even under a potentially reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine in
the years ahead, automation using AI tools could not only pass muster but will arguably make
administration more accountable, not less, given the precision with which machine-learning
algorithm’s objectives must be specified (Coglianese 2021).
A related accountability issue arises when algorithms that are used by governments are
designed and operated by private entities. In such instances, they could run afoul of the private
nondelegation doctrine, which disfavors the outsourcing of governmental decision-making to
nongovernmental entities. Although intuitively this doctrine might constrain governments in
relying on contractors to develop AI systems, the principal rationale of the private nondelegation
doctrine—avoidance of corruption—simply does not fit the context of machine learning. Private
delegation has only been disfavored by the courts when private entities are likely to make
decisions based on their own narrow self-interest instead of the broader public interest.
Algorithms, however, are programmed to optimize objectives defined by the operators. As long
as those operators act responsibly and are held accountable to the public through active
governmental input and oversight, then the algorithms themselves pose no risk of corruption. AIdriven automation may even result in more accountable and faithful digital agents than human
officials (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017).
Procedural due process. A second legal question is whether the principle of procedural
due process requires a human decision, such that automation cannot lawfully be used to take
humans out of the loop (Citron, 2008). Procedural due process typically calls for government
decision-makers who will listen, serve as neutral arbiters, and render reasoned judgments. Yet as
much as these usual requirements might seem intuitively to call for a human decision, under
prevailing constitutional principles what is demanded of procedural due process is supposed to
be assessed using a balancing test comprising three factors: (1) the affected private interests; (2)
the risk of decision-making error; and (3) the government’s interests concerning fiscal and
administrative burdens (Mathews v. Eldridge, 1976). AI-driven automated decisions would
likely pass muster quite easily under this balancing test if an automated system would reduce
errors and operate more efficiently. Indeed, due process might even eventually demand that
government rely on algorithmic tools to achieve fairer and more consistent decisions than
humans can deliver.
Moreover, despite the black-box nature of machine learning, due process expectations
would likely be satisfied if automation is developed in a manner open to scrutiny (Coglianese &
Lehr, 2019). Affected interests could be afforded the opportunity to interrogate design choices
made by architects of these algorithms, and key design choices could be vetted through open
processes with input from advisory committees, peer reviewers, and public comments or
hearings.
Transparency. A third concern, transparency, stems from what has come to be considered
a hallmark of best practices in public administration. One best practice—which has been called
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“fishbowl transparency” (Coglianese, 2009)—would imply that information about the design and
operation of an algorithmic system be made publicly available and any key decision-making
meetings about the algorithm should also be open to the public. Yet fishbowl transparency is not
absolute. Laws such as the Freedom of Information Act contain a variety of exceptions to
required disclosures of public information, such as for law enforcement strategies or trade
secrets. Some automated systems could legitimately fall under such exceptions.
An additional form of transparency—“reasoned transparency” (Coglianese, 2009)—
demands that administrators provide reasons for their decisions. The use of machine learning
algorithms would seem problematic from the standpoint of reason-giving because their outputs
cannot be intuitively understood or easily explained. Yet human decision-making can also be a
black box, and human officials are not expected to furnish complete explanations of their
decisions. Under prevailing reason-giving doctrine, administrators that rely on automation can
likely satisfy their reason-giving obligations by explaining in general terms how their algorithms
were designed to work and what data sources they are using (Coglianese & Lehr, 2019). Courts
already defer to administrators’ expertise in cases involving complex machinery or mathematical
analyses, so it can be expected that courts will likely assume a similar deferential approach to
evaluating an agency’s reasons for decisions based on machine learning.
Furthermore, new technological advances continue to increase the interpretability of
machine learning models, opening up the algorithmic black box (Selbst & Barocas, 2018; Kearns
& Roth, 2019). With time, administrators will be able to do even more to make sense to all who
are affected by algorithms of the logic behind their decisions.
Privacy. Because machine learning algorithms thrive on large quantities of data, they
raise a fourth category of legal concerns centered on privacy. Even when processed data includes
sensitive or personal information, any privacy concerns should be as manageable as any of those
related to large administrative data systems that exist today which do not drive AI systems.
Agencies already routinely handle an array of personal information, such as names, Social
Security numbers, and biometrics. Protecting these data while concomitantly advancing agency
goals is a task many agencies already have experience addressing.
Reasonably well-settled legal standards guide U.S. agencies in addressing privacy
concerns. The Privacy Act of 1974 limits how agencies can collect, disclose, and maintain
personal information. The E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies conduct privacy impact
assessments when developing technology that implicates privacy concerns. Admittedly, growing
calls exist for the federal government to adopt new data privacy laws, akin to the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or to privacy laws adopted in some states,
such as California. To the extent such new laws are adopted, they could necessitate greater
attentiveness to privacy protections, but so far neither GDPR nor California’s privacy law has
created an insuperable barrier to the use of artificial intelligence.
Machine learning algorithms do present a distinctive privacy concern in their ability to
combine seemingly disparate, non-sensitive data to yield predictions about personal information,
such as sexual orientation or political ideology. In the private sector, retailers have been able to
use predictive analytics to infer private details from seemingly benign data, and then they have
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used those highly accurate inferences for targeted advertising. When it comes to the public
sector, the worry is that government officials could do the same, but for ill purposes. Still, such
officials already are constrained from using this reverse-engineering potential of learning
algorithms in ways adverse to individuals’ interests because current law prohibits the “abuse of
discretion” by government officials (Appel & Coglianese, 2021). As long as federal agencies use
AI tools responsibly, there should seem to be no intrinsic privacy law impediment to that use.
Equal protection. Finally, automated systems raise legal concerns about equality. Biases
in the existing data on which machine learning algorithms train may simply become perpetuated,
or perhaps even exacerbated, in AI-driven systems. Even when demographic details on race or
gender are excluded from training datasets, algorithms might “find” a pattern based on these
variables using the other variables in the dataset. Some research has documented the potential for
racial and gender discrepancies in AI-based systems used for employment hiring (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2004) and medical decision-making (Obermeyer et al., 2019). A widely circulated
report published in ProPublica showed signs of racial bias in the (non-learning) algorithms in a
system known as COMPAS meant to provide an objective measure of recidivism (Angwin et al.,
2016).
Bias obviously exists with human decision-making, and indeed human bias will often be
an underlying source of bias in AI-driven systems when they are trained on data that
accumulated in the past from human judgments (Mayson, 2019). But bias is also a concern with
machine learning algorithms, especially when the underlying training data are already biased. As
a legal matter, when bias is intentional, it will clearly offend constitutional equality protections—
whether in a system driven by humans or machines. But absent some independent showing of
such intentional animus in the underlying objectives established for an AI system, it will be
difficult for litigants to show unlawful discrimination with AI just from its outputs.
One challenge for individuals in protected classes who are adversely affected by an AI
system will be to demonstrate that they were discriminated on the basis of race (Coglianese &
Lehr, 2017). This is due to the inscrutability of machine learning algorithms; they do not assign
weights to or permit causal inferences about specific variables. Even when individuals within a
protected class are treated worse than others, it is possible that the algorithm led to better
outcomes for that class overall than would have been in a counterfactual situation—or it might
even be that any demographic variables in the dataset on which the algorithm trained were not
actually influential at all in producing the outcomes. Individuals claiming algorithmic injustice
must show that the government’s decision involved real reliance on a suspect classification. Such
claims will face an uphill climb.
Another obstacle to sustaining an equal protection challenge to machine learning systems
will be the lack of “categorical treatment” in any adverse decisions produced through machine
learning (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). The Supreme Court has disapproved of administrative
decisions on equal protection grounds when the government has afforded a categorical
preference or disadvantage to certain classes. Such categorical treatment is unlikely ever to arise
with automated administration because an algorithm’s objective function will be defined in terms
of some class-neutral outcome, even if underlying data contains human bias. As a result, we may
expect few equal protection challenges to algorithmic administration to trigger heightened
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scrutiny. Furthermore, even if a court did apply heightened scrutiny to a machine learning
system, this might not lead it to find a violation of equal protection. After all, when
administrators rely on machine learning systems, they often do so to advance the kinds of
compelling state interests which will withstand heightened scrutiny.
Summary. The five legal issues potentially implicated by governmental use of machine
learning—accountability, procedural due process, transparency, privacy, and equal protection—
do not appear to present any insurmountable barriers to the use of AI under prevailing law. These
legal issues already arise with respect to governmental decisions based on human judgment or
more conventional types of analytic tools. If the courts tolerate a status quo grounded on human
biases and frailties, then they are unlikely to object categorically to automated systems that rely
on digital algorithms, especially when these automated systems can be shown to overcome
human limitations. Obviously, the law may always change in ways that could lead to greater
scrutiny of AI tools, as new legal rulings and precedents may lead the law to evolve alongside
the increased use of algorithmic decision-making in government (Deeks, 2019). Indeed, some
local jurisdictions have in recent years adopted restrictions on the use of AI-based facial
recognition software by law enforcement personnel. Yet is also quite possible that legal change
in the future could work in favor of the adoption of AI tools. In some cases, we might expect that
responsible use of algorithmic tools will enhance principles of administrative justice and
eventually the use of these tools by government come to be legally required (Coglianese &
Hefter, 2021). This would be especially so if data scientists continue to make progress in
developing new algorithmic techniques that successfully address the various fairness,
transparency, accountability, and other concerns that have been raised about the use of AI
tools(Berk & Kuchibhotla, 2021; Kearns & Roth, 2019; Mullainathan 2019).
Nevertheless, in concluding that prevailing administrative law and constitutional law
principles pose no intrinsic legal bars to the use of AI, we do not deny that some specific
instances of automation will likely be challenged in court in the future. Already algorithmic tools
deployed by governments have found themselves subject to legal challenge (Coglianese & Ben
Dor, 2021; Yoo & Lai, 2020). If administrators fail to exercise due diligence in their
development of particular automated systems, they may well face court decisions disapproving
of their use or finding that such use violates due process or is “arbitrary or capricious.” As a
result, when it comes to adopting AI in specific contexts for specific tasks, public administrators
will need to take care in deciding whether to replace human decision-making with an automated
system and then, when they do, in how they design and operate such systems. The key will be for
public administrators to act responsibly when choosing automated administration.
III. CHOOSING AUTOMATED ADMINISTRATION
Decisions about the use automation will need to be guided by a careful assessment of
whether AI tools can lead to better processes and outcomes. Such evaluative judgments cannot
be meaningfully made in the abstract but must be made within specific contexts and with respect
to specific tasks. In some cases, machine learning will prove more beneficial than human
decision-making, while other times it will not. Despite the inherent context-specific nature of
choices about automation, it is possible to outline relevant factors that ought to be considered. In
general, the criteria for deciding whether to shift an existing human-driven process to one driven
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by artificial intelligence will fall into three categories: preconditions for the successful use of
automation, the overall value of any such use, and considerations related to justifying automation
so that it meets with acceptance by courts, legislative overseers, and the public.
A. Preconditions for Use
To use machine learning tools effectively, a public administrator will need to ensure at
least four preconditions for such use are met. Where the preconditions for artificial intelligence
cannot be sufficiently met, automation should be avoided. The following four conditions are
necessary but not sufficient for shifting from a human-driven process to automation.
1. Adequate resources. Administrators will need both the budgetary and human capital
resources needed to build, test, maintain, and oversee an automated system. These systems
require expertise, some of which could reside within a government agency but which could also
be met through private contractors. Government agencies will also need adequate digital
computing resources, such as data storage and digital processing capabilities. Both the stored
data and computing processors will need adequate cybersecurity protections.
2. Goal clarity and precision. Machine learning algorithms must be programmed to
optimize a mathematically defined objective. Vague goals, such as fairness or reasonableness,
cannot meet the mathematical precision needed. Fairness would need to be defined, such as by
specifying that favorable outcomes generated by an automated system are to be distributed
across racial and gender groups in ways that are proportionate to the distribution in an applicant
pool or in society overall. In addition, any tradeoffs between values must be specified precisely.
If the question is how much forecasting accuracy should be sacrificed for proportionality in
outcomes, the tradeoff will need to be specified mathematically. In making such tradeoffs,
agencies will need to have sufficient statutory direction and social input about how to define
such tradeoffs.
3. Data availability. Machine learning works by identifying patterns within large
quantities of data. If large quantities of relevant data are not available, then machine learning will
not be an option for automating an agency task. Data may be lacking for a variety of reasons. In
some cases, they may exist, but only in paper form. Or they may be practically unavailable if
disparate digital datasets are unable to be combined because they lack a common identifier to
link data about specific businesses or individuals.
More conceptually, data may be unavailable due to an insufficient number of repeated
events around which a common set of variables could be collected. It is one thing to draw on
data of individuals’ DNA, for example, to determine whether a DNA sample from a crime scene
matches that of a defendant. It is another to have a dataset that could determine whether a
defendant was driving a red Corvette through the intersection of Sixth and Main Streets on July
23rd (Rigano, 2018). It will obviously be difficult to find a large set of data for cases or tasks that
are truly sui generis.
4. External validity. The data available for training a machine learning algorithm must fit
with and be applicable to the population that will be subjected to the outcomes of an automated
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system. If relevant factors change more quickly than an algorithm can be replenished with new
data and retrained, then the algorithm can become be “brittle”—in other words, lack external
validity (Cummings, 2020). A machine learning algorithm used for economic forecasting, for
example, might work well under relatively stable economic circumstances but fail to generate
accurate forecasts of employment during an unprecedented pandemic-induced recession. Of
course, when circumstances become unusual, human judgment can also become brittle, so the
need for external validity on the part of AI systems will not demand perfection but will instead
require greater external validity than existing human-based alternatives.
B. The Value of Use
When the four preconditions above are met, AI-driven automation will be a plausible
substitute for human judgment. None of these preconditions needs to be perfectly satisfied. But if
they are not even minimally met in a given use case, it will not make sense to contemplate the
use of automation.
In deciding whether to go forward, public administrators should determine whether
improvement over the status quo will be attained. Although the specific criteria for determining
such improvement will depend on the specific use contemplated (Young, Bullock & Lecy, 2019),
at least three general sets of impacts warrant consideration.
1. Task performance. Current human-based systems center on tasks, so one set of criteria
should be guided by the objectives underlying those tasks: Would automation complete
public administrators’ tasks more accurately? Would it reduce the time it takes to
complete these tasks? Would it be less costly, needing fewer FTEs or other resources?
Would automation yield a greater degree of consistency in outcomes? Each of these
questions can be asked in light of the current purpose of the human-driven system in use.
The overarching idea will be to determine whether automation would help public
administrators better achieve their objectives.
2. User or beneficiary impacts. It will also be vital to attend to the effects of automation
on the applicants, beneficiaries, or other individuals and businesses who use or are
directly affected by a specific system. These impacts may already be part of the task
objectives, but if not they should be carefully considered. How does the system treat
those directly affected by its outputs? Do some portion of users suffer disproportionate
adverse effects? Do they feel like the system has sufficiently served them well? In
answering these questions, it is not necessary that an automated system be perfect—just
better than the status quo. If the status quo of human-based systems necessitates that
members of the public wait hours on the telephone to speak to someone who can assist
them, a machine learning chatbot might be much better in relative terms, even if not
ideal. In this regard, it is notable that the online clearinghouse, eBay, deploys a fully
automated dispute resolution software system that resolves disputes so satisfactorily that
customers with disputes are actually more inclined to return to eBay than those who
never have a dispute (Barton & Bibas, 2017).

11

3. Societal impacts. An administrator should also consider broader societal effects: How
would automation indirectly affect others? Will remaining errors have broader
consequences? Errors might not have huge ramifications with, say, an automated
customer service system used for answering commonly asked questions. But the
ramifications to society overall could be profound for an AI system that automatically
determines who receives commercial aircraft pilot licenses. Again, the key question to
ask will be whether any broader societal effects would be better or worse than similar
effects under the status quo.
In characterizing the value of an automated system across all three sets of impacts—that
is, task performance, direct impacts, and indirect impacts—it is important to be as specific as
possible about the degree of improvements (or performance declines) resulting from a shift to
automation. Automation will not necessarily fare equally well on each of these impacts.
Decisions will need to be made about which impacts are more important. If automation proves
less costly but slightly less accurate than the status quo, how important is accuracy for the use
case at hand? How consequential are any errors that might remain with an automated system? It
might be one thing for the U.S. Postal Service to tolerate some modest number of additional
mistakes in letter sorting if automation lowers the costs of mail sorting dramatically, but it would
be another matter altogether to make that same kind of tradeoff with respect to identifying safety
risks on offshore oil rigs.
C. Justifying the Use
Decisions to automate governmental tasks can pose risks of controversy and conflict.
Agency officials should consider these risks and seek to manage them by building a justification
for their use of automation. The justification will need to inform and satisfy legislative overseers,
courts, and members of the public. The need for justification—and the risk of controversy—will
likely be affected by two factors: (1) the degree to which automation overrides human decisionmaking, and (2) the stakes associated with the automated system’s use.
Automation could provide just an input into human decision-making, as in the use at the
heart of State v. Loomis (2016). Or automation could provide a default output that stands unless
overridden by a human. Or it could make the final decision subject only to judicial review—
essentially, a human-out-of-the-loop system. All things being equal, new uses of machine
learning that only provide inputs into agency actions will be less likely to be create controversy
or be challenged in court than uses that create defaults or decisions (Coglianese & Lehr 2017).
In addition, the lower the stakes associated with the task performed by automation, the
lower the risk of controversy or litigation. Among the lowest conceivable stakes will be purely
internal staff uses within a public agency, such as when its computer support staff uses a
machine learning algorithm as part of a chat bot that answers calls for password resets on office
computers. That chatbot could even be designed to work with humans out of the loop,
responding to requests entirely on its own, and yet controversy will be highly unlikely (Brown,
2016). On the other hand, automated systems that are involved in the processing of applications
for economically valuable licenses or permits by private businesses will have substantial

12

stakes—and thus will pose risk of controversy or even litigation—even if they provide only
inputs into decisions made by human officials.
When AI systems create defaults or decisions over high-stakes matters, public
administrators can anticipate controversy to ensue or legal challenges to be filed. In these cases,
they will need to take pains to demonstrate that they have engaged in careful planning and testing
of these automated systems. Public notice and public engagement will often be appropriate in the
development and design of automated systems in these circumstances, both to build confidence
that may head off controversy and to reassure overseers that such systems have been designed
and are being used responsibly.
Validation of automated systems will also be vital in justifying their use. Administrators
should make validation data available to the public. They may also consider subjecting the
design and performance of automated systems to external peer review or third-party auditing.
Pilot programs could be established to run the algorithm in tandem with human decision-makers
for a period of time to observe how it will operate in practice. Once the digital system has
replaced a human-driven system, validation efforts should continue to occur early in its use
before any irreversible loss of human capital. Future upgrades to the digital system will benefit
from continued validation that each iteration improves on the one before—or at least does not
present unacceptable side effects.
When contracting out for technical support and services in developing a machine learning
system, public administrators should scrutinize with care the sale pitches that contractors make
(Dekel & Schurr, 2014), aware of the reality that their agencies, more than the contractors, will
be held responsible for problems that arise with an automated system. In crafting contracts for AI
services, administrators will do well to account for their need to access and disclose sufficient
information about the algorithm, underlying data, and validation results to satisfy transparency
norms (Coglianese & Lampmann, 2021). Overall, administrators should ensure that the
procurement process will result in transparent outcomes for public administration, even if it
involves proprietary software that would otherwise shield the algorithms from scrutiny.
Finally, public administrators should approach automation with humility, caution, and
care, recognizing that AI systems are themselves creatures of human decision-making that can be
prone to blind spots and biases. Because frailties of human judgment affect all human
decisions—including decisions about whether and how to design and use automated systems—
public administrators should remain vigilant. Such vigilance will also help in reassuring courts,
legislative overseers, and the public.
CONCLUSION
A future of governance driven by AI-based automation naturally gives rise to concerns by
judges, policymakers, and members of the public about how such use of digital tools will affect
the efficacy, fairness, and transparency of governmental processes. But the status quo already
relies on human “algorithms” that are far from perfect. If algorithmic automation can usher in a
new public administration that—at least for specific uses—achieves better results at constant or
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fewer resources than current processes based on human decision-making, then both government
administrators and the public would do well to support the use of artificial intelligence.
We conclude that the current legal system creates no insuperable obstacles to such public
sector use of automation as a substitute for, or an augmentation of, current decision-making by
human officials. Choices about whether and when to use AI tools will thus rest firmly on the
shoulders of public administrators. These choices should be made with care, taking into due
consideration the preconditions for the use of AI, the value of such use in terms of improving the
status quo, and the need for public administrators to engage the public and ensure sufficient
justification of their decisions about automation. Responsible, well-informed human decisions
about the design and deployment of automation will shape whether AI is permitted to overcome
the limitations of human decision-making and improve governmental performance.

NOTE
Although no universally accepted definition of AI exists, for the purposes of this paper we
focus on systems that rely on the use of machine learning algorithms, both supervised and
unsupervised. Such algorithms, which themselves come in a variety of forms, are increasingly
making possible the automation of a range of previously human-centered activities, such as with
the driving of automobiles and the reading of x-rays. These kinds of algorithmic tools are
sometimes described with a variety of phrases, including “big data,” “predictive analytics,”
“deep learning,” “reinforcement learning,” “neural networks,” “random forests,” and “natural
language processing.” In the context of public administration, the use of such tools would
constitute one manifestation of what has been described variously as smart or data-smart
government (Goldsmith & Crawford, 2014; Noveck, 2015) or moneyballing government (Nussle
& Orszag, 2015). For discussion of the relevant characteristics of the type of machine learning
algorithms we have in mind, see Coglianese & Lehr (2019), Anastasopoulos & Whitford (2018),
and Coglianese & Lehr (2017).
*
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